Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine by Radin, Margaret Jane
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 70 Issue 4 Article 2 
2002 
Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine 
Margaret Jane Radin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 
1125 (2002). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine 
Cover Page Footnote 
William Benjamin Scott & Luna M. Scott Professor of Law and Director, Program in Law, Science and 
Technology, Stanford Law School, www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/radin. An earlier version of this essay 
was presented on March 29, 2001, as the Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture at Fordham University 
School of Law. I was honored by the invitation, and am grateful for the helpful comments by facutly and 
students in response to it. I am especially indebted to my research assistant, Kevin E. Collins, and to Ajay 
Ayyappan of the Fordham Law Review, for their help in the transition from lecture to essay. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss4/2 
LECTURE
ONLINE STANDARDIZATION AND THE
INTEGRATION OF TEXT AND MACHINE*
Margaret Jane Radz**
INTRODUCTION
In this essay, I consider two interrelated topics: standardization in
the online environment, and the blurring of the distinction between
text and machine in the digital world. I argue that this blurring is
helping to break down the distinction between technological
standards and legal standards. The consequences of this coalescence
between technology and law will be far-reaching, or so I venture to
predict.
In the first section of this essay, I will introduce the topic of
standardization versus customization, and then will compare
technological and legal standards. Then, in the second section, I will
talk about the blurring of the distinction between text and machine,
and consider some of the consequences for contract and intellectual
property regimes.
* © 2002 by Margaret Jane Radin. Permission is hereby granted to reproduce and
distribute this Article in whole or in part for personal, professional or educational
purposes, provided such copies are disseminated at or below cost, provided that each
copy bears this notice, and provided that the Fordham Law Review is credited as the
original published source.
** William Benjamin Scott & Luna M. Scott Professor of Law and Director, Program
in Law, Science and Technology, Stanford Law School, www.law.stanford.edu/
faculty/radin. An earlier version of this essay was presented on March 29,2001, as the
Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture at Fordham University School of Law. I was
honored by the invitation, and am grateful for the helpful comments by faculty and
students in response to it. I am especially indebted to my research assistant, Kevin E.
Collins, and to Ajay Ayyappan of the Fordhamn Law Review, for their help in the
transition from lecture to essay.
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I. STANDARDIZATION IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT
A. Background: Standardization vs. Customization
Roughly speaking, customization involves individualization,
production of a unique item, or attention to a particularized person or
application, whereas standardization involves non-individualization or
mass production of a class of identical items, without attention to a
particular person or application. In this essay, the word "standard"
refers to the specific contours of the identical exemplars in the class,
the template into which all exemplars fit or by means of which they
can be accurately described.'
A popular analogy for standardization and customization involves
the production of clothing. Custom-made clothing is made to order,
individualized, and tailored to suit a particular person. "Off the rack"
clothing, however, is mass produced to one set of measurements and
offered for sale on racks of identical garments. Scholars often talk
about background terms prescribed by law (for example, terms
specified by the UCC for contracts) as "off the rack," meaning that
they apply to everyone and are not individualized. When these terms
are waivable, the parties can displace them with individualized terms,
which are described as "tailored."2
Another analogy used in considering standardization and
customization involves language. Language is a kind of
standardization; complete individualization would preclude
communication, for, as Wittgenstein argued, there is no such thing as
a private language. 3 In order for communication to be possible, much
must be shared; at a minimum there must be a community of
acceptance of common descriptions and their meanings in recurring
contexts. In this way of thinking about standards, each different
language is a standard unto itself. The Internet is largely standardized
on English, for example; and people who want to communicate using
the Internet are at a disadvantage if they do not have English at least
as a second language.
1. Perhaps confusingly, the word "standard" is used in a contrary sense in
jurisprudential discourse distinguishing "rules" from "standards." In that discourse, a
"standard" implies particularized judgment by a decision maker, whereas a "rule"
implies absence of decision-making discretion for a class of cases. See, e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685,
1687-89 (1976) (discussing the "formal realizability" of rules); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58-59 (1992). Thus, a
"standard" in the sense used in this essay is actually rule-like from the point of view of
that jurisprudential discourse.
2. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91-92 (1989) (describing
"tailored defaults" in the context of contract law).
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 256-81 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Oxford 1968).
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The language analogy also shows us that standardization and
customization can be fractal in structure. That is, within the broad
standard called English there can be many narrower standards that
are customized from the point of view of the broad standard, but are
standards from the point of view of still more finely tuned descriptions
and applications. Consider dialects; and, in a legal setting, consider
customized usages in various trade groups, recognized in contract
interpretation by the validation of such usages. For example,
"chicken" might mean a certain thing to one group of people, and it
might mean something else to other people in the world who are
outside that group.4
Another way to put this is that nothing is wholly customized,
because that would imply a kind of complete nominalism that makes
meaning impossible; and nothing is wholly standardized, because that
would imply a kind of rule-like structure in which every detail is
specified in advance, no matter how fine or deeply embedded, and this
kind of advance prescription of details is philosophically implausible.
Both of the popular analogies-clothing and language-point up
the aspect of individualization versus collectivization. Things that are
customized are individualized or individuated, and things that are
standardized are collectivized or shared among many. Whether
something is customized or standardized depends upon perspective.
A usage of trade, for example, is customized from the point of view of
the general English language, but it is standardized from the point of
view of those within the industry who cannot unilaterally change what
the usage of trade means.
B. Comparison of Legal and Technical Standardization
There is a discourse involving legal standardization, mostly
discussing standard-form-i.e., standardized -contracts. There is also
a discourse involving technical standardization, mostly discussing the
processes and institutions that establish and maintain technical
standards. So far, though, we-cyberlaw scholars, practitioners and
policy pundits, engineers of the digital environment-have not really
considered legal and technical standardization together. For reasons
this essay attempts to make clear, that is what we now should do.
Technical standardization is usually understood to mean uniform
physical and design specifications or metrics. Plugs have two prongs
that are spaced a certain distance apart, and they are all the same;
they fit into sockets with holes that are sized and spaced properly, and
the sockets are all the same too. This is not an accident, but the result
of standards laid down by a standard-setting body such as the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association




("IEEE-SA").5 Another example is the size and format of disk drives
and compact discs ("CDs") -again, not an accident, but a standard
that is set. TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol), the base-level programming structure that runs the
Internet, is also a standard. A computer cannot connect to the
Internet unless it is running software that follows that particular set of
instructions. As I will discuss later, standards can come about through
market emergence as well as promulgation by some institution: an
example is the Windows operating system. Most people use
computers that run Windows and most programs are written for
Windows; Windows has become a standard.
The metric system itself is a standard. Without a measuring system
in common, making the pieces of the man-made physical world
function together would be difficult or impossible.6 In fact, from the
viewpoint of an engineer, most of our man-made physical world is
standardized, and so are our methods of measuring and describing it;
we inhabit an environment of standards.
Legal standardization is similarly ubiquitous; but so far we have not
thought of it in terms that will point up the analogy. Legal
standardization can be seen in different contexts and at different
levels, once we are willing to call it that (it too exhibits the fractal
structure of standardization). My thesis is that making the
comparison between legal and technical standardization explicit will
be helpful in reconceptualizing legal regimes for the digital
environment.
What is legal standardization? At a high level of generality, there is
international harmonization, the effort to bring the laws of different
nations into uniformity (or greater compatibility) with each other. So,
for example, when the U.S. entered the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, we harmonized our patent law to some extent, 7 changing
the term to twenty years from the date of the application for the
patent,' which is now the standard for all developed countries.' Prior
to that our term of seventeen years from date of issuance of the patent
was customized to the U.S. (viewed from a global perspective; at the
5. See IEEE Standards Association: Overview, at http://standards.ieee.org/sa/sa-
view.html (last modified Mar. 9,2001).
6. A costly embarrassment for NASA occurred recently when a spacecraft
malfunctioned because thruster firing data using the English system of measurement
were input into a navigational program that expected metric data. Kathy Sawyer,
Engineers' Lapse Led to Loss of Mars Spacecraft; Lockheed Didn't Tally Metric Units,
Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1999, at Al.
7. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS")
which contained the patent harmonization provisions was included in the GATT bill
that became effective on June 8, 1995. Kevin Cuenot, Note, Perilous Potholes In The
Path Toward Patent Law Harmonization, 11 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 101, 110 nn. 53-
56 (1999).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2001).
9. See supra note 7.
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same time, of course, our patent term was a standard viewed from a
perspective internal to the U.S.). Similar initiatives toward
harmonization-standardization-are taking place in copyright. For
example, the developed countries now all grant copyright for the life
of the author plus seventy years. The lengthening of the term in the
U.S., accomplished by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act," was defended specifically with reference to a need to bring the
U.S. to the level of protection existing in the European Union."
At the national level, standardization of state law within the United
States has been the explicit project of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL").12 The most
successful of the proposed uniform state laws become national
standards, as the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") did. Of
course, some states adopted some customized provisions; and contract
law interpretation is still the province of state courts, so some
interpretations are customized, from the perspective of national
harmonization. Many of the proposed uniform acts do not succeed in
becoming a standard; for example, the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act was only adopted by twenty states,"3 and landlord and
tenant law thus remains customized by state. The proposed Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"), now pending,
was promulgated by the NCCUSL but became quite controversial and
was rejected by the American Law Institute and hence could not
become part of the UCC. It was relabeled by its proponents as a
freestanding initiative. If it becomes a uniform standard, it will be
very important for transactions in the online environment. So far,
however, it has only been adopted in two states. 4 If it does not pass in
a critical mass of states, it may turn out not to be the standardization
that its proponents hope for (and its opponents fear). "
10. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I §
102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998)).
11. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 1993 OJ. (L 290) 9 (specifying a copyright term
of life of the author plus seventy years), available at http'J/europa.cu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sgadoc.
12. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, About Us, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp (last visited Sep. 27,2001).
13. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts
About... The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, at http:J/www.nccusi.
orglnccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-urlta.asp (last visited on Sept. 27,
2001).
14. UCITA Online, What's Happening to UCITA in the States, at
http://wvw.ucitaonline.com/whathap.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2001) (noting that
UCITA has been passed in Maryland and Virginia).
15. For one discussion of the policy implications of UCITA, see Symposiunt:
Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Information Age: The Impact of Article
2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Transactions in Information and




At a lower level of generality, many specific legal rules or
provisions can be usefully thought of as standards. A coordination
rule such as "drive on the right" is a standard; and so are all the
"default" provisions of commercial law, such as the provision that
delivery will be at the seller's place of business if the parties do not
specify otherwise. Finally, consider the existence of widespread or
even uniform boilerplate contractual terms in some fields or
industries. These adhesion contracts are in fact a form of
standardization, one that is very important for the future of
transactions in cyberspace.
C. Pros and Cons of Standardization
Is standardization good or bad from a policy point of view? Of
course, the answer may depend on what we mean by "policy." We
could mean economic efficiency, so in asking whether standardization
is good or bad we could be asking whether standardization has the
effect of maximizing our social product, social welfare, or whatever
maximand your particular economic theory posits. Or, we could mean
some other kind of policy, such as maximizing individual liberty or
fostering human self-constitution or self-government. For now, I will
leave open the big question of what policy we should focus on, and
instead recount some oft-cited-standard! -good and bad
characteristics of standardization. This exercise is meant to show at
least that balancing is often appropriate in deciding whether a
particular kind of standardization is on the whole desirable or not; in
other words, that decisions about standardization will often
themselves be (relatively) customized.
What's good about standards? Often mentioned are network
effects and fostering interoperability. Where network effects (also
called network externalities or increasing returns) are present, the
more people do the same thing or use the same thing, the more value
it has for each participant.16  A common example is telephone
interconnection: a single telephone in the world would be of no use to
the owner, but the more telephones that are interconnected (that is,
able to access all other telephones), the better for each user. Another
more recent standard example is the Internet protocol, TCP/IP. The
more people who are on the Internet through use of this standard
protocol, the more valuable the Internet is for each user.
Those are technological examples, but I think legal standardization
might sometimes engender network effects too. The fact that the
UCC has been enacted in all states makes it less costly for each
commercial actor to interact with other commercial actors. The fact
16. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and
Network Effects, 8 J. Econ. Persp. Spring 1994, at 93 (providing a basic exposition of
the economics of systems displaying network effects).
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that most corporations adopt the laws of Delaware makes it less costly
for corporations to interact with other corporations and with
consumers.
17
Compatibility and interoperability are also often cited as beneficial
attributes of standardization. Interoperability is interrelated with
network effects; in my examples, interconnected telephones and
computers on the Internet, interoperability is what gives rise to the
network effect. Interoperability can be beneficial even if not allied
with network effects. Plugs and sockets were a simple example of
standardization; the plug and the socket must interoperate, and that
means they must be compatible. It takes a standard to accomplish
that. Interoperability is very important in the world of technology if a
company is not going to market an entire self-contained system. If a
company is going to market cassettes for somebody else's video
player, for example, the cassettes have to be the right size to fit that
machine, and programmed properly so the machine will play them.
The company has to manufacture its cassettes to conform to those
standards. (If the maker of the machine wants to force customers to
buy only its own cassettes, it may try to make it difficult or impossible
for its competitor to use the necessary standard; 8 thus standards can
implicate competition policy; but more about this later, when I discuss
the downside of standardization.)
Perhaps interoperability has its analogue in law. Consider how
property must interoperate with contract in order for market
transactions to work. Property rules are needed in order to stabilize
entitlements as a basis for exchange, and contract rules are needed in
order to stabilize conditions under which exchanges will be binding.
Property and contract function together to create a legal
infrastructure for the market. Standardized property rules from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction mesh with standardized rules of contract
and facilitate the functioning of the market just as standardized plugs
and sockets facilitate the functioning of electrical systems. Moreover,
doctrines such as the statute of frauds and estoppel serve as bridges
between property and contract. Alienability belongs both to property
and contract, and non-waivability (inalienability) is a contract doctrine
that in effect creates an entitlement (one that cannot be voluntarily
divested).
I have been talking about the way that standardization is often
thought to be beneficial, but standardization is often thought to be
17. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 Va. L Rev. 713, 719-
29 (1997) (discussing the benefits of standard terms in contracts and Delaware law as
the source of commonly used corporate terms).
18. See, e.g., Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514-17 (9th
Cir. 1992) (illustrating how Sega used an initialization code in its software to ensure
that only licensees could attain compatibility).
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harmful, too. In particular, standardization is associated with the
possibility of lock-in, the possibility of lock-out, and the possibility of
coercion.
Lock-in is often mentioned in conjunction with standardization. An
example often given is the QWERTYUIOP typewriter keyboard.
This arrangement of letters is not the most efficient for fast and
accurate typing, but because everyone is using it and used to it, we are
locked in.19 It would be difficult for us to learn a different keyboard,
and a lot of other things would have to be changed as well; we would
not want to switch unless everybody else switched too (coordination
costs).
The QWERTY example has become traditional to illustrate lock-in
caused by learning costs. There are other traditional examples of
lock-in, caused more by the need for coordination or interoperability.
Consider the Betamax story: this format for VCR's (and the
videotapes that fit into them) was said to be superior to VHS, but
once VHS attained a critical mass, everyone had to use VHS.2 The
critical mass is the tipping point. Where lock-in occurs after a market
tips in this way, coordination is crucial because of various important
kinds of interoperability or the need for interaction with other users;
when one person switches alone-even if the new technology is
"better" in the abstract-she is left high and dry. Everyone must
switch at the same time because of the things that the technology
plugs into and the programs that are written for it, and so on. The
Windows operating system exhibits this kind of lock-in; it also exhibits
the kind of lock-in involving learning costs- double-whammy lock-in.
As a legal analogue to technological lock-in, consider arcane
doctrines that cannot be changed because we have all learned them
and built up systems around them, and it would be too costly to
substitute a new regime. In my former role as a property teacher, I
often thought the common law system of estates in land might fit into
that category; ditto for the common law doctrines governing
covenants running with the land and equitable servitudes. Every year
I would ask my students: why haven't we abolished the traditional
rule against perpetuities, future interests such as contingent
remainders and possibilities of reverter, and all that stuff? England
abolished all this early in the twentieth century. The only explanation
my students and I could ever come up with-even though it seems
half facetious-is that everybody in the legislature had to learn this,
everybody in the bar had to learn this, and we're stuck with it because
of sunk costs and the anticipated extra costs of learning something
else. One could also argue that these doctrines interoperate with
19. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers
and Proceedings), May 1985, at 332,332-37.
20. Bill Mandel, One Last Lament for the Beta Format, an Idea Whose Time Has
Gone, Chi. Trib., Jan. 27, 1988, at 17.
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others that would also have to be changed, like conveyancing,
perhaps.
Suppose some state came to the conclusion that it would be better
to switch to an entirely new legal regime for land entitlements, or for
contracts. If no one else switched to that system, would anyone do
business in the maverick state? It wouldn't matter if the new regime
were theoretically better; if only one state adopted it, that state would
be isolated.
Another downside risk sometimes associated with standardization is
what I will call, for the sake of symmetry, "lock-out." Lock-out comes
about if one firm has intellectual property rights in technology that
becomes a standard. Others who need to use the standard then have
to pay to use it, or else be locked out. So, for example, it is very hard
to communicate with other computer users unless you pay to license
the Windows operating system.
Lock-out is avoided with open standards. The Windows operating
system is a closed standard, because Microsoft owns it and keeps its
code secret; those who want to write programs that will plug in to it
must pay Microsoft. On the other hand, TCP/IP is an open standard;
everyone can use it to write programs that will mesh with the
architecture that structures the Internet. The distinction between
open and closed standards is an artifact of an interaction between
standardization and our current intellectual property regimes. If
copyright and patent regimes did not exist, then the possibility of
lock-out and paying for essential standards would also not exist.
In our IP world, closed standards are a downside risk. In addition
to propertization by means of copyright, as in Windows, there is also
propertization by means of patent. Many business methods, and more
broadly, methods of operation are patented in the online world. For
example, there is a patent on the use of the shopping cart metaphor
on commercial websites 1 If that turns out to be a valid patent n
every vendor who maintains a website interface that has a shopping
cart will have to pay a license fee to the patentee.
So these closed-proprietary-standards lock out those who do not
pay. Depending on one's view of the reach of IP monopolies and of
the competitive context, this may be a deleterious result. A problem
that has been coming up frequently in this context is the attempt to
capture an open standard and make it closed. This is one of the things
21. Scott Thurm, Online: A Flood of Web Parents Stirs Dispute Over Tactics, Wall
St. J., Oct. 9, 1998, at B1.
22. Patents that become very valuable usually become the subject of litigation; it is
only after litigation that one knows for sure whether a patent is valid. A recent study
shows that validity is almost a coin-flip: litigated patents are held valid slightly over
fifty percent of the time. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on




that Microsoft has been accused of doing to harm its competition. In
a dispute involving Microsoft and Sun Microsystems, Inc. ("Sun"), for
example, Sun promulgated the Java language as an open standard so
that everybody would be able to write programs in Java (the better to
compete with Microsoft); but Microsoft changed Java a little bit so
that those who wanted to write programs in Java compatible with
Microsoft products would have to use Microsoft's proprietary version
of Java.'
Are there legal analogies to this IP lock-out problem (in contexts
where it is a problem)? Maybe. The scope of allowable business
method patents is now very broad-anything that is an algorithm is
potentially patentable as long as it is useful, concrete, and innovative
enough.24 Novel legal arguments might be patentable- the possibility
is not that far-fetched.' Then, whoever wanted to use the new
argument might have to license it from whoever patented it. Perhaps,
more realistically, a particularly good form contract or pleading might
be patentable. At any rate, documents such as pleadings and form
contracts can surely be copyrighted by their authors (or by the firms
that employ their authors), insofar as they are copyrightable
expression.26
Whoever owns IP rights in pleadings and other legal documents has
an interesting choice: try to keep the documents closed and make
others pay if they want to use them; or open them-put them in the
public domain or grant blanket free licenses-so that they will
propagate and more quickly become a standard.27 Once the form
contract you drafted is all over the Internet, used by everyone, this
may help to validate it; i.e., turn it into an actual binding commitment
instead of just a purported contract; i.e., be the mechanism by which
the contract actually becomes fully functional. Do you want to
capture revenue by charging people to use your form contract, or do
23. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir.
1999).
24. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (explaining the requirements for patentability of algorithms).
25. The Patent and Trademark Office has granted patents on methods for
teaching certain subject matter with greater efficiency. These precedents could
extend to methods for deploying legal arguments to convince a judge (merely an
exercise in educating the judge as to the strength of a legal position) with greater
efficiency.
26. That is, original enough and characterizable as protectable expression, not
subject to defenses such as merger and scenes a faire.
27. It is not fanciful to think that legal documents will be copied and reused by
others. Stanford Law School's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website has
posted all the pleadings that are available in securities class action lawsuits. See
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, at
http://securities.stanford.edu (last updated Jan. 4, 2002). Once those pleadings are
readily available, the near-monopoly of a particular specialized firm is broken,
because other firms can submit substantially similar pleadings without having to
develop them from scratch.
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you want to capture revenue by having your contract become a
validated standard, lowering uncertainty and transaction costs?
A third downside risk associated with standardization has to do
with the possibility of coercion or lack of choice. When a standard
occupies the field, a user has no choice but to play by the standard if
she is going to play at all. I would like to use WordPerfect for Mac, if
I could, but I cannot, because if I do not use Word instead, nobody
could read my documents and nobody could print them out; I have
been forced to use a Microsoft product even though I would have
preferred not to.
The argument about coercion or lack of choice is very familiar in
the legal realm; it is the main issue that makes standardized adhesion
contracts problematic from a policy point of view (at least to some
people). Contracts of adhesion-that is, purported contracts, for their
validity is in doubt-have proliferated in the online world. Almost
every website contains a little link at the bottom of the home page
labeled "terms" or something similar. If you click on these terms, you
-will most often see a full-blown purported adhesion contract
containing much fine print, in which the user exculpates the firm for
its own negligence, agrees to binding arbitration or litigation on its
home turf under its home jurisdiction's law, agrees to limit damages to
the price of the product, waives all warranties express and implied,
and so on. To the extent that such a purported contract binds
everyone who accesses the website, with no choice on their part other
than to forego that website, it is a standard that forecloses choice; and
to the extent that the same standard-form contract is used on many
different websites, it becomes a more powerful standard, and the risk
of lack of choice or coercion increases.'
D. How Do Standards Come Into Being?
Standards, whether technological or legal, can come into being by
promulgation or enactment: top-down imposition by an authoritative
entity. Standards can also come into being through market evolution:
bottom-up emergence through operation of market forces. Or,
standards can come into being in a hybrid manner, through some
combination of top-down imposition and bottom-up emergence; for
example, imposition by a market coalition such as a trade group.
In the legal world, promulgation or enactment-by a legislature, an
executive order, or a court-is a familiar way to arrive at standards.
28. The problem of lack of choice or coercion is not very salient when market
substitutes exist that are not governed by the particular terms, because the consumer
can purchase equivalent goods or services on other terms from other vendors,
assuming she is somehow made aware of the terms-though that is surely a big
assumption. The problem becomes more significant as a policy matter if the terms




The United States Supreme Court imposed a standard when it
formulated the Miranda warnings to deal with the issue of coercion
due to custodial interrogation.29 Promulgation is also common in the
technological world. Standards are imposed "top-down" by a
standard-setting body; for example, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology ("NIST") ° or the IEEE-SA.
Standards, both legal and technological, can also come about
through "bottom-up" market emergence. In this scenario, one
standard "wins out" in a Darwinian competition for survival. As
mentioned earlier, the VHS format won out over Beta, even though
Beta was introduced first and was arguably a technologically superior
solution.3 1  The Darwinian logic is that once a "tipping point" is
reached, the minority format must die out.3 2  A similar scenario is
sometimes operating in the legal world. For example, clauses in
corporate charters or in bonds perhaps became standardized through
a process of evolution capped by a tipping point.3
Although "top-down" promulgation and "bottom-up" evolution
both occur, a hybrid emergence in which a market coalition
cooperates to impose a standard may occur just as, if not more, often.
Negotiated rule-making is perhaps a clear example of hybrid
standardization; 34 as are the activities of trade associations in
29. Remember that (unfortunately) the Miranda warnings would be called a
"rule" in the rules-and-standards type of jurisprudence mentioned earlier. See supra
note 1. In that parlance, a "standard" to take care of the problem of coercion in
custodial interrogation would vest discretion in the police to treat suspects
reasonably. I have long thought that the rules-and-standards terminology is
philosophically misleading and should be eschewed. See Margaret Jane Radin &
Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1019, 1053-55 (1991) (arguing for the deconstruction of the rules/standard
distinction). And, in spite of the confusion my use here might at first engender among
jurisprudes familiar with rules-and-standards terminology, I think, for reasons I hope
this essay will make clear, that it is going to be important to recognize that.rules such
as the Miranda warnings are powerful standards in the same sense as technological
standards such as specifications for plugs and sockets.
30. See National Institute of Standards and Technology, General Information, at
http://www.nist.gov/public__affairs/general2.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2002).
31. Mandel, supra note 20.
32. See Nicolai J. Foss, Austrian and Post-Marshallian Economics: The Bridging
Work of George Richardson, in Economic Organization, Capabilities and Co-
ordination: Essays in Honour of G.B. Richardson 138 (Nicolai J. Foss & Brian J.
Loasby eds., 1998); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolttion in Law and Economics, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 641, 641-42 (1996).
33. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 767-69 (1995) (explaining the Darwinian process by which
contract teriis become standardized).
34. Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10811, 10811 n.1 (2001) (stating that,
"'negotiated rulemaking'... refer[s] to the specific process by which agencies
formally negotiate rules.... [S]ome scholars and practitioners use the term




recommending legislation. In a very similar way, these coalitions also
bring about technological standards-for example, the DVD format,
or the Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI") that has caused so
much debate."
E. How Should Standards Be Evaluated?
As I recounted earlier, standards are, in the abstract, "good" for a
number of reasons, and also "bad" for a number of reasons. I think
there is practically no getting around the necessity of evaluating them
in context, from a number of angles, including competition policy,
freedom of choice, and other public policies. I want only to underline
here that evaluation of whether standardization -whether legal or
technological--is "good" or "bad" should not depend on how the
standard came about?6
A good technical standard might come about through market
emergence. The best product might have won out in a competitive
market. Or, we might need some standard for smooth functioning,
and be indifferent about which one. On the other hand, an inferior
product might have tipped the market and eliminated its competitors;
we could be stuck with such a product because no one else can enter
unless they can somehow take over the entire market immediately.
The very same reasoning applies to legal standardization. Contracts
in an industry might be standard because those are the terms that
consumers consistently choose; the standardized contract represents
the package of terms that won out in a free market. On the other
hand, standardized contracts may reflect collusion or some other
market failure such as a "lemons equilibrium" brought about by
inadequate consumer information.'
Similarly, if a standard arrives by way of promulgation, that in itself
also tells us nothing about how it should be evaluated. If a legal
standard comes about through legislation, one might think-and
courts have tended to think-that the legislative standard is entitled
35. In an effort to enforce more rigorously the interests of copyright holders in
digital music played on portable devices, a coalition of music, electronics, and
computer companies sought to establish a standard that would allow portable music
players to interoperate with digital music files and discriminate between -legitimate"
(i.e., watermarked) and "illegitimate" copies. Don Clark, Digital Music Standards Are
Adopted in an Effort to Protect Against Piracy, Wall St. J., June 29, 1999 at B9. The
concretization of technological standards, however, has proven difficult. As of the
summer of 2001, "there is currently no consensus for adoption" of -technologies to be
used in the protection of digital music." Secure Digital Music Initiative, SDMI
Reviews Screening Technology Needs, at http'//wwwv.sdmi.orglpr/Amsterdam-May-
18_2001_PR.htm (May 18, 2001).
36. Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind.
L.J. 1125, 1148 (2000).
37. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488,490-91 (1970).
2002] 1137
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to a presumption that it is socially beneficial, because it was imposed
by a collective process or a representative body that takes into
account everyone's interests. But we do not have to be thoroughgoing
public choice theorists to note the prevalence of industry capture; and
to believe that, at least some of the time, interest groups capture the
process and get the statute or rule written the way they want it.
This kind of capture happens both in technical and in legal
standard-setting. In the technical case, sometimes a company is
helpful in getting a standard promulgated, and then it turns out the
company had a patent pending, so that everyone who wants to use the
standard must license the patent. In the legal case, sometimes
interest groups control the drafting process. This is arguably what
happened with the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") 39 -captured by the copyright
industries-or the pending UCITA4 -captured by the software
industry.
From a policy point of view, then, how a standard is arrived at does
not tell us whether it is good or bad, whether it should be welcomed or
deplored. In the real world, however, it matters a great deal how
standards are arrived at, particularly for legal standards. It is a lot
harder to overturn legislation once it is on the books than it is to find a
reason to disallow "bottom-up" industry standardization. Not
everything about either adhesion contracts or technical
standardization, even if unwise, is going to turn out to rise to the level
of violation of antitrust laws, federal intellectual property laws, federal
consumer protection regulation, or the Constitution; in fact, very little
about them will rise to that level. So, it is a very good strategy for
industries to capture legislatures or standards-setting bodies, because
once they get standards promulgated, it is hard to overturn them.
II. LEGAL AND TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION AND THE
COALESCENCE OF TEXT AND MACHINE
I believe that there is something deeper going on when it turns out
that legal and technical standardization are so closely allied to each
other. I believe that the digital revolution is bringing about a seismic
shift in our conceptual landscape, which I want to explore here,
though only preliminarily. I call this shift the breakdown of the
distinction between text and technology, or between expression and
functionality, or between words and machine. A number of different
developments converge to suggest such a conceptual shift. Here, I
38. Michael J. Schallop, The IPR Paradox: Leveraging Intellectual Property Rights
to Encourage Interoperability in the Network Computing Age, Am. Intell. Prop. L.
Ass'n Q.J., Summer 2000, at 195, 283-84 (discussing standard manipulation by
companies that have patents pending).
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-04 (2000).
40. See supra note 14.
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want to mention six of them: (1) the prevalent economists' view of
adhesion contracts; (2) the advent of machine-made contracts; (3) the
propagation of viral contracts; (4) the development of Digital Rights
Management Systems ("DRMSs"); (5) the development of extensible
markup language ("XML"); and (6) the legal treatment of computer
programs.
A. Contract as Product
The prevalent economic view of contract has broken down the
distinction between agreement, formerly thought of as a text, and the
product being sold, formerly thought of as a functional object or a
collection of functional features. This view of contract actually
predates the online environment,4 but in the online environment it is
becoming more powerful. I call this view "contract as product," and
contrast it with the view of contract as consent or agreement. 2
In the "contract as product" view, the contract is part of the
product, part of the collection of functional components, and not a
separate text about that collection. What does this mean? For
example, suppose you buy a cell phone that contains a chip that will
wear out within a year, and the phone comes with a set of fine print
terms including a clause that says in the event of any dispute arising
out of the transaction you must litigate in California under California
law. Both the chip and the clause are functionally the same from the
economic point of view: if you know that they are there, they will
help determine what you are willing to pay for the phone. Notice that
in order for the market to function efficiently this view must suppose
that at least the marginal consumer must understand what chips and
clauses are being purchased. How the product will work, how long it
is going to last, what kind of warranties it comes with, what limitations
on remedies it comes with-all of these are exactly the same from the
economic point of view. The product you are buying is not just the
phone, but the phone plus the terms. The contract is not a text about
a product, but part of a product.
This contract as product view is suited to adhesion contracts
because in such a take-it-or-leave-it transaction there is no dickering
over terms and no dickering over the components either. You can
buy this product that is going to wear out in a year, over which you
will be forced to litigate in California if a dispute arises, or you can
walk away and buy something else more to your liking. In order for
the market to function efficiently, in this view, one must suppose that
other products and/or other terms are available. You don't get to say,
"I wish you would remanufacture this so it will not wear out in a
41. See, eg., Lewis A. Komhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 Cal.
L. Rev. 1151, 1153-54 (1976).
42. Radin, supra note 36, at 1125-26.
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year," and you also don't get to say, "I wish you would rewrite the
contract so that I can litigate in my home state."
In the offline world, most contracts43 have been like this for some
time, and thus the economic view has suited transactional reality.
Nevertheless, lay people have largely continued to conceive of
contract as dickered consent between two people. This lay
conception-contract as negotiated text-will, I think, be significantly
eroded in the online environment, for two reasons. On the one hand,
it is likely that standardized transactions will occupy even more of the
transactional universe;44 and on the other hand, the nature of the
transaction is more transparent because the fine print that comes with
the functionality being purchased is more accessible to everyone. The
contract is merging into the product; the text is merging into the
functionality.
B. Machine-made Contract
The advent of machine-made contracts-the use of programs to
create binding commitment-is hastening the breakdown of the
distinction between text and machine. Consider business-to-business
("B2B") electronic commerce and the overall transformation of
supply-chain management. Manufacturing is becoming ever more
automated, and the advent of the machine-made contract completes
the picture by automating the supply process. If some computer
processor "realizes" that more supplies are needed at a certain part of
the assembly process, it can also search certain suppliers and see
which can most readily supply what is needed, and it can give the go-
ahead for the supplies to be delivered. Computers at each end of the
transaction could be programmed with sets of terms; when the buyer
computer encounters a seller computer, they could enter into a
computerized handshake protocol, and if they determine that they
have a set of terms in common they could arrive at a commitment,
without a human being having to sign off on it.45 I think this
procedure is going to turn out to be so efficient that it will in fact
become the contracting norm in B2B transactions. When (if) this
transformation does occur, it will help undermine the distinction
between the text and the machine, because computerized contracting
will be seen to be integrated with general computerized management
of manufacturing processes.
43. In fact, I start my contracts class by bringing in contracts that I have
unwittingly entered into in the past few weeks-the back of a FedEx slip, a parking
lot ticket, an airline ticket, etc.
44. There are pressures that I think will lead to greater standardization; but
greater customization is also possible. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
45. This will work for many run-of-the-mill transactions. Sometimes, however,
human intervention will be needed, and it may be difficult to program computers to




Perhaps the process of integration of text and machine is even
clearer in the case of what I call viral contracting. Viral contract-or
purported viral contract, because the legal validity of this procedure is
not yet determined-occurs when a digital product has digital terms
integrated with it, and the product-plus-terms propagates down a
chain of distribution, with the intent that the terms be binding on
whoever comes into possession of the package. The digital product
could be a software program or some other kind of content that
someone wishes to propagate. Integrated with such a digital product
could be digitally programmed terms that purport to constrain use of
the digital product-for example, prohibition of criticism of the
program, or prohibition of reverse engineering.' The economists'
contract-as-product view is here brought to fruition; the digitized
product and the digitized terms are literally (not just conceptually) the
same in kind and part of a package. Not only does such a package
undermine the distinction between text and functionality, it seems
difficult to maintain the distinction at all. That is, at this point it
seems arbitrary to call one set of programming statements a functional
product and another set of programming statements a text.
D. Digital Rights Management Systems
It also seems that DRMSs are doing their part to undermine the
distinction between text and machine. A DRMS is a program that
limits distribution and use of some piece of digitized content; it is
essentially next-generation copy protection .4  That is, a DRMS could
prevent content from being copied, or allow it to be copied once and
sent to one recipient, but deleted from the original recipient's
computer; or it could delete the content after a set time period; and
many other permutations. DRMSs give rise to many policy problems
that I am not discussing here, in particular the problem of
46. The contractual assurances that earlier coders give to later coders under the
General Public License ("GPL") is one example of a widely discussed viral contract
currently in use. In theory, the earlier coders' contributions to a software program
give these earlier coders property rights under copyright law to exclude later coders
from modifying the program-making a derivative work-or from distributing the
code. (These property rights depend on the later coders' creations being a -derivative
work" of the earlier coders' programs.) Although some prefer to conceive of the
GPL as a grant of defeasible property rights, I think it is best viewed as a contractual
license that gives the later coders permission to modify and distribute the program if
they perform certain affirmative obligations, primarily making their source code
available to everyone in a distributional community. Whether the contract is valid as
between an early coder and a later coder who begins with a version of the program
already modified several times since the earlier coder made his contribution has yet to
be determined by the courts.
47. Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 Berkeley Tech. l. 137 (1997).
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overreaching by content owners who can use technological protection
to prevent activities that are otherwise the right of the user (for
example, copying of material that is not protected by copyright)." At
least it seems that DRMSs are also contributing to the undermining of
the idea that a contract is a text, separate from and accompanying
some machine or functionality. The DRMS is itself a machine or
functionality, and it is not at all clear whether to think of it as a
contract; to me it seems like non-contractual technological self-help.4 9
E. Functional Computer Languages
Another development that seems to fit into the general pattern of
absorbing contract into machinery is the development of
computerized languages such as XML. XML is a language that can
tag significant functional digitized texts. 0 The purpose of XML is to
make possible efficient searches in electronic commerce. For
example, if every web store that had an umbrella for sale used codes
that tagged the item as an umbrella, it would be possible to use my
browser to search directly for umbrellas, and receive a listing of all
umbrellas for sale. It seems clear that the same tagging procedure
could be used for digitized texts that represent legal terms. For
example, a code at the beginning and end of the fine print could
designate it as a "contract." More usefully, perhaps, a code at the
beginning and end of a particular clause could designate it as a
"choice of law clause." With these tags, my browser could be used to
search for all choice-of-law clauses.
The result of widespread deployment of XML-type tags would be
that one could search for the exact products needed and, in the very
same way, one could also search for the exact clauses desired. Here
again there is no difference between functionality and (what was
formerly conceived of as) text. The result, if it comes to pass, will be
that consumers could search for products they like and warranties
they like in exactly the same way. Attorneys could search all clauses
used by others and replicate the ones they like (which might have the
effect of propagating clauses that attorneys like, or think best for their
clients).
48. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1389-90 (2000) (discussing the use of DRMSs to impose
"unwarranted burdens on [the] users of copyrighted works").
49. One could argue that the consumer decides whether or not to purchase the
content-plus-DRMS package, and that this decision is contractual. Radin, supra note
36, at 1138. At a minimum, this kind of "contract" strengthens the contract-as-
product view, and, as I am arguing, helps dissolve the distinction between text and
machine.
50. Jane K. Winn, Making XML Pay: Revising Existing Electronic Payments Law
to Accommodate Innovation, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1477, 1480-81 (2000).
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F. Computer Programs and Intellectual Property
I have been giving a few examples of what I think is a widespread
breakdown of the distinction between text and technology, text and
functionality, text and machine, owing to the basic fact that
digitization makes no such distinction. My examples have related to
contract. But meanwhile, perhaps the clearest example has already
occurred to you: the anomalous dual treatment of computer programs
in intellectual property law.
Computer programs are both text and machine. They are text when
considered as code statements, they are machines when considered as
devices for accomplishing a task. Copyright law reflects the text
perspective (programs are considered literary works)," patent law
reflects the machine perspective (a programmed computer is a "new
machine")., 2 The fact that computer programs are both copyrightable
and patentable is anomalous for intellectual property law. Copyright
is supposed to exclude works that are functional; patent is supposed
to focus on functionality and exclude texts.' Computer programs are
the only large area covered both by patent and copyright. This
anomaly is obscured to some extent by the fact that copyright and
patent regard programs differently: patent focuses on the protocol for
accomplishing the task, however the programmer chooses to code it,
whereas copyright focuses on the code statements, but also their
structure, sequence and organization. The difference between
structure, sequence and organization (copyrightable) and useful
algorithm, protocol or method (patentable) is, however, conceptually
difficult to maintain. This difficulty reflects the fact that computer
programs can be understood either as text or machine. Those who
write code sometimes genuinely feel that it is their speech and should
be protected by the First Amendment.5 At the same time, it is clear
51. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting the definition of literary work in 17 U.S.C. § 101 -which
includes expression comprised of "'numbers, or other ... numerical symbols or
indicia"'-and holding object and source code to be literary works).
52. In re Alappat, 33 F3d 1526, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, CJ., concurring
and dissenting).
53. Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection
of Computer Programs, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L 41, 52-53 (1998)
(describing the functionality limitations of copyright doctrine and its application to
computer programs).
54. See, e.g., Patent and Trademark Office, United States Department of
Commerce, Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions: Final Version,
available at httpJ/www.uspto.govlweblofficeslpacldapploppdlpdflciig.pdf (distinguish-
ing between sometimes patentable "functional descriptive" subject matter and
categorically unpatentable "nonfunctional descriptive" subject matter).
55. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendinent, 48 U.C.L.A. L Rev. 1057,
1059-61 (2001). But see R. Polk Wagner, The Medium is the Mistake: The Law of
Software for the First Amendment, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 387, 404-05 (1998) (arguing that
software is not speech for First Amendment purposes). This issue is being actively
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that the primary raison d'etre for programs is their technological
function, their ability to accomplish a task.
To summarize what I have been saying: the fact of digitization of
both texts and technologies is contributing to the breakdown of the
distinction between the two. Part of this breakdown is signified by the
parallelisms between legal and technical standardization. Put another
way, the integration of legal and technical standardization is one
aspect of the integration of text and technology.
CONCLUSION: How SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT
STANDARDIZATION AND CUSTOMIZATION ONLINE?
As discussed earlier, the online environment facilitates
standardization in various ways. On the other hand, it is clear that
new kinds of customization are possible- technologically feasible-in
the online environment. The functionality that is supplied can be
customized: for example, manufacturing computers to order.
Content (textual products) can also be customized, geared toward the
users' tastes or political views. 6 In the same way, customization of
terms and conditions is possible. Instead of a take-it-or-leave-it set of
fine print terms, a website could offer a menu of choices for various
clauses, and the user could check boxes for which ones were desired.
One might choose the warranty disclaimer (free) or the two-year
warranty (pay $1 extra); one might choose to accede to the arbitration
clause (free) or the clause allowing litigation in one's home state (pay
$2 extra).
This kind of customization of terms offline is, to some extent,
already apparent (purchasing service contracts or extended warranties
on big-ticket items, for example). It would be inexpensive to do the
same thing online even for small transactions, because the process of
implementing such a program could be outsourced to a third party
specializing in such programs and seamlessly integrated with the
purchase process at the e-commerce website.5 7 Online customization
could be facilitated by the use of languages such as XML that make it
debated by the courts. Compare Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111
F.Supp.2d 294, 327-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding free speech interests insufficient to
overturn restrictions imposed by the DMCA on the dissemination of code that
circumvents a DRMS), affd Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001), with DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (overturning a trade secret-based injunction on the dissemination of
computer code on First Amendment grounds).
56. Cass Sunstein has argued that this form of online customization may, due to
the lack of any necessary contact with the equivalent of the public forum when online,
polarize debate and undermine the republican values on which the First Amendment
was built. Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 89-103 (2001).
57. The third party would run a program that would continually calculate
actuarially how much it should cost to have a better warranty, taking into account




technologically feasible to search and assemble particular
components.
Of course, whether such customization will come to pass depends
upon whether there will be market demand for it (whether people will
want to use it), and that we do not yet know. If it does come to pass,
contract to some extent can turn back toward the traditional
understanding that still lingers, which is that contract involves
negotiation and agreement between two willing parties. On the other
hand, the situation could turn instead to more standardization, and
the traditional understanding of contract could be further eroded.
Standardization is fostered by the advent of machine-made contracts,
because the computers that enter into them are going to need sets of
standardized terms; and then these sets of terms that become
widespread in B2B may propagate into Business to Consumer
("B2C") transactions as well. In a context of uncertainty about
validity of terms, those that are widely used will come to be approved
by courts or regulatory bodies. XML tags will help propagate such
terms. As people copy them and use them because they seem to be
workable, such terms will become more certain and more workable,
and thus adoption could snowball. (This is a species of network effect
with contract terms.) There is a strong possibility, I think, that there
will be even more standard-form contracts and less customization in
the digital environment, even though customization is technically
possible.
We have rehearsed the policy concerns with regard to
standardization, either technical or legal, and they have to do with the
eroding of user autonomy and choice. But customization has its own
set of serious policy issues. It could turn out that firms will offer very
low-quality legal/technological packages (minimal functionality and
onerous terms) and allow customers to check boxes and pay more
money for better functionality and better terms. Such a situation will
push the haves and have-nots further apart, because it seems
predictable that the haves will check the boxes to pay more money,
and the have-nots will not. In this situation, warranties are for the
well off.
At this point in the evolution of e-commerce, all I want to do is
point out that these policy debates about online customization versus
standardization could replicate debates we have had before in the
offline environment, about such things as whether or not there should
be a non-waivable implied warranty of habitability in rental housing;
whether consumers should be able to waive tort liability; and so on.
We can see these issues coming-whether or not online privacy is a
waivable entitlement is one such issue-so let's not reinvent the wheel
in how we debate them.
Standardization versus customization in the online environment
does raise new versions of some old questions. I think, however, that
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it raises some new questions too, or at least brings to the surface some
basic questions that have previously been submerged, such as the
future of consumer choice and consent, and how to evaluate the
market versus other processes by which standards are created. In
facing these questions, it will be helpful both to understand the
dissolution of the distinction between text and technology in the
online environment and, in light of that understanding, translate our
understanding of the pros and cons of technical standardization into
our understanding of the pros and cons of legal standardization.
